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Abstract 
In this paper I provide a conceptual analysis of an underexplored issue in the debate 
about effective altruism: its theory of effectiveness. First, I distinguish effectiveness 
from efficiency and claim that effective altruism understands effectiveness through the 
lens of efficiency. Then, I discuss the limitations of this approach in particular with 
respect to the charge that it is incapable of supporting structural change. Finally, I 
propose an expansion of the notion of effectiveness of effective altruism by referring to 
the debate in political philosophy about realism and the practical challenge of normative 
theories. I argue that effective altruism, both as a social movement and as a conceptual 
paradigm, would benefit from clarifying its ideal, taking into account the role of 
institutions, and expanding its idea of feasibility.  
 
I. EFFECTIVE ALTRUISM: THEORY OF A PRACTICE  
Effective altruism (henceforth EA) is one of those few intellectual positions where 
philosophical theorizing has directly given rise to a powerful social movement. The 
striking peculiarity of EA is its commitment to connect one of our most general, and yet 
vague, duties – namely that of doing the good – with some practical, and possibly really 
effective, envisaged outcomes. What is unique to EA is its promise of uncompromising 
ethical clarity brought about in a practically effective manner.  
Many have discussed the moral premises of EA. In this paper, instead, I provide a 
critical analysis of an underexplored aspect of EA, namely its effectiveness dimension. I 
will thus not address other fundamental issues regarding the ethics of giving, as to how 
much and why we ought to donate, to whom we should donate first, whether there is a 
conflict between the duty of impartiality and legitimate partial commitments, the 
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altruistic repugnant conclusion, and so on.1 In particular, I will try to understand 
whether the conception of effectiveness that EA embeds is coherent with the underlying 
assumption that our duty is to bring about as much good as possible.  
The paper will proceed as follows. In the next section I provide a definition of 
effectiveness and try to better understand EA’s conception of effectiveness. In the third 
section, I distinguish effectiveness and efficiency and shed light on EA’s penchant for 
efficiency. Then, I briefly mention the main critiques offered against EA. In the fifth 
section, I highlight other notions related to effectiveness that have been discussed in 
debates about feasibility, realism, and the methodology of political philosophy. Building 
on these notions, in the sixth section, I seek to expand EA’s theory of effectiveness so 
as to understand how EA can respond to some of the critiques outlined. The final 
section provides a sort of agenda for effective altruists (henceforth EAs) to make EA 
more in line with a conceptually and practically deeper understanding of the 
commitment to effectiveness.  
 
II. A DEFINITION OF EFFECTIVENESS 
Given its theoretical formulation and ambitions, I shall now analyze EA’s theory of 
effectiveness from a theoretical point of view, namely not by checking whether the 
actions recommended by EAs are actually effective in practice. But what is 
effectiveness about? In a proper sense, only an action (or a set thereof) can be effective. 
Of course, theories are primarily effective on people’s thoughts and, as a consequence 
of this, on actions. However, given EA’s insistence on providing practical 
recommendations, I will focus here only on actions. Hence, I will refer to the 
effectiveness of the actions that the theory recommends were they put into practice.  
                                                          
1 W. MacAskill, Doing Good Better. Effective Altruism and How You Can Make a Difference (London, 
2016); J. McMahan, ‘Philosophical Critiques of Effective Altruism’, The Philosophers’ Magazine 73 
(2016): pp. 92-99; T. Pummer, ‘Whether and Where to Give’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 44 (2016): 
pp. 77-95; P. Singer, The Most Good You Can Do. How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About 
Living Ethically (New Haven and London, 2015); G. Pellegrino, ‘Effective Altruism and the Altruistic 
Repugnant Conclusion’, Essays in Philosophy 18 (2017): pp. 1-24. 
3 
 
An action (A) is effective (E) with respect to a value (V) iff the state of affairs 
(SoA) brought about by (A) embeds (V).  
This definition is binary because it rests on the ex post certainty of knowing what has in 
reality been effective. It can also be formulated in a scalar sense by asking how much 
(V) an (A) can actually bring about. A scalar definition is particularly suitable when we 
need to be probabilistic, that is, when we need to estimate in advance the expected 
effectiveness of an action in a condition of uncertainty.  
The expected effectiveness (EE) of an action regarding a value (V) can be 
measured with the probability (P) that a (SoA), which embeds (V), is reached 
given the action (A), which implements (SoA). 
Building on this, EA’s account of effectiveness can be put as an answer to the following 
question: How could we maximize the expected outcome given our limited epistemic 
and practical resources? It seems rational to suppose that given our limited resources, 
the complexity of the world and the urgency of some problems, we would do better to 
focus on problems we can expect that can be solved by agents about whom we have 
reliable information. Three features seem obvious candidates to make sense of this.  
The first two features are directness and specificity of goals. I define a goal as the 
condition in which a desired (V) is embedded in a (SoA). The logic behind EA implies 
that in order to be effective, we must preferably aim at addressing specific goals that we 
can expect to reach through a foreseeable course of actions made by recognizable 
agents. This formulation seems reasonable enough. After all, who would want to engage 
with the realization of vague goals for whose implementation we have no clear route? 
The third feature concerns the measurability of effectiveness. On EA’s view, in order to 
meet criteria of rationality, the expected effectiveness of an (A) should be measurable.  
These three features are related to a further overall trait of EA: its attempt to reduce 
complexity. Usually, acting and making such an action effective in bringing about the 
desired state of affairs may be extremely complicated. We may fail to bring about good 
states of affairs for many obvious but not fully predictable reasons. To make a long 
story short, there are at least objective features (the world is complex and the causes of 
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injustice are intricate), subjective features (people are often selfish or irrational in their 
behavior), and intersubjective features (people have competing legitimate interests).  
With respect to these features, EA provides reasons to reduce the problems stemming 
from the subjective area, by demanding that people focus on what one is capable of 
doing altruistically (typically donating). Moreover, it de facto ignores the 
intersubjective issues because it assumes that actions to address urgent and real 
priorities – such as the reduction of extreme poverty or fatal diseases – do not conflict 
with each other. And, finally, it has a very peculiar strategy to (not) deal with the 
objective complexity of the world because it usually recommends simply donating to 
the most effective charities or NGOs, whose effectiveness has been assessed by meta-
charities.  
In sum, EA’s theory of effectiveness may be summarized with the following points: 
Not any goal is compatible with an effectiveness-driven approach. Only 
measurable goals are. How much (V) is included in a (SoA) should be 
measurable.  
We should bring about the (SoA) that maximizes the amount of (V). 
In theory, we can devise only an action (or a restricted set thereof) that brings 
about such a (SoA) maximizing the desired (V). 
 
III. EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY   
So far so good. These features seem to flow from some general prescriptions of 
rationality applied to hard choices in a realistic scenario. In what follows I shall argue 
that, unlike what some EAs have maintained, EA is, in fact, not about effectiveness 
generally conceived. Rather, it concerns a specific way of pursuing effectiveness, 
namely efficiency. What is the difference between effectiveness and efficiency? 
Although they are sometimes used interchangeably, we can safely say that they differ in 
the following way. Effectiveness concerns the overall capacity of an action to actually 
reach a goal, while efficiency concerns whether a certain goal is reached with the best 
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use of resources. We may say, for instance, that a procedure or technology is more 
efficient than another because it needs fewer resources to generate the desired output. 
Or we may say that a strategy was effective but wasteful, namely non-efficient.  
I define efficiency in the following way. 
(A) is efficient to the extent that, given a fixed amount of resources (R), it best 
employs (R) to reach (V) in (SoA) with respect to other feasible alternatives.  
Hence, efficiency, unlike effectiveness, is dependent upon a parametrical amount of 
resources. Moreover, it can only be a scalar notion and its function is mostly 
comparative in adjudicating between the competing alternatives.  
I say that EAs seem mostly concerned with efficiency for the following reasons. First, 
they repeatedly aim at calculating the impact that a unit of input (say $1) can have in 
terms of units of goodness – say numbers of lives saved, or impact in terms of 
Disability-adjusted life year (DALY) and Quality-adjusted life year (QALY). Many 
EAs, and in particular Pummer and MacAskill, argue for the conditional duty to be 
efficient upon deciding to donate. In other words, they claim that we have a duty to 
generate the maximum expected amount of output, given a certain amount of resources 
(typically a portion of one’s income). Moreover, MacAskill repeatedly mentions the 
criterion of cost-effectiveness, which is efficiency in other terms.2  
Second, they seem to urge us to be concerned with both internal and external efficiency 
in the use of resources. Internally we ought to choose our career by aiming at the one 
whose expected salary is the highest so that we can donate more. EA also aims at 
external efficiency because charities are to be selected according to their efficiency in 
getting most good (measured, for instance, in terms of lives saved) per each monetary 
input received.   
Third, they recommend that we assess the value of our actions – regarding donation but 
also the choice of our career – given the law of diminishing marginal returns, namely in 
                                                          
2 MacAskill, Doing Good Better, p. 135.  
6 
 
respect of how much good our action or career can achieve given the fact that our action 
and career is only a marginal addition to the actions and work of others.3  
It is unclear to me how much this conflation of effectiveness into efficiency stems from 
a lack of understanding of the difference between the two concepts, or from a rhetorical 
emphasis that EAs put in using the idea of effectiveness in order to make it sound more 
attractive. As to my knowledge, only Pallotta has argued against the idea that EA is 
about efficiency.4 But he takes too narrow an understanding of what efficiency means. 
By efficiency he means the organization or procedure that costs less, the so-called 
‘admin-to-program ratio,’ which does not take into account what is actually achieved in 
practice by the organization or procedure. My argument is immune to this reply because 
the definition of efficiency I employ does not collapse into the mere minimization of 
costs and like the definition of effectiveness includes the notion of goal, which is what 
counts in practical matters. If this interpretation is convincing, it shouldn’t be seen as a 
disappointment. After all, as noted, efficiency is a prominent way of contributing to 
effectiveness. But it is not the same thing, given its specific focus on how to reach the 
outcome given a limited amount of resources. Of course, I do not want to argue that 
pursuing efficient interventions is wrong and that EAs should aim at inefficient 
strategies. Rather, the question is whether this understanding of effectiveness via 
efficiency lives up to its ambitions.  
Critics point out that one cannot really aim at improving the condition of the worst-off 
without tackling the structural causes of poverty, that is, without addressing institutional 
issues of injustice, oppression, the political dimension of disadvantage, etc.5 Brian 
                                                          
3 See in particular MacAskill, Doing Good Better.  
4 D. Pallotta, ‘“Efficiency” Measures Miss the Point’, The Effective Altruism Handbook, ed. R. Carey 
(Oxford, 2015), pp. 32-34.  
5 On these critiques, see Lisa Herzog, ‘Can “Effective Altruism” Really Change the World?’, Open 
Democracy, 22 February 2016,  <https://www.opendemocracy.net/transformation/lisa-herzog/can-
effective-altruism-really-change-world>; and A. Srinivasan, ‘Stop the Robot Apocalypse’, London 
Review of Books 37 (2015): pp. 3-6. For a more detailed analysis of why EA is not equipped to 
understand the importance of structural change, see T. Syme, ‘Charity vs. Revolution: Effective Altruism 
and the Systemic Change Objection’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, online first.  
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Berkey defines this argument as the ‘institutionalist critique.’6 By refusing to address 
these issues, EAs would fail to tackle the real underlying causes of the most pressing 
problems that EAs are committed to solving. Moreover, some have argued that EA’s 
specific recommendations might have perverse effects in creating alternative providers 
of services (for instance education) that would be typically used by those who are not 
the worst-off, thus leaving the worst-off dependent upon the state service whose quality 
is likely to be diminished because of the lower pressure that people put on state 
agencies.7 Such effects are hardly detected by ex post assessments of aid, whose 
perspective is usually short-term and extremely targeted, thus overlooking the possibly 
perverse or unintended effects of aid.8 In sum, such critics claim that EA lacks insight in 
the structural causes of moral wrongs because EA is concerned only with the effects of 
deep problems. Hence, the critical argument concludes, in overlooking the systemic and 
long-term issues, EA does not live up to its practical commitments.  
In many cases these remarks seem plausible. But to be fair to EA, EAs also have a point 
in focusing only on actions that can actually bring about real and measurable, albeit 
‘minor,’ improvements. In one sense this approach is likely to be very effective, at least 
if we compare it to other available alternatives. As Berkey argues, EAs may have 
mistakenly assessed the probabilities of enacting change, but, unlike others, they ‘have 
at least attempted to engage with these challenging issues.’9 In general, EAs seem to 
rely on the assumption that we should practically care only about issues on which we 
can have a sizeable and expectedly direct impact. To be sure, changing the background 
condition of society might in the end be much more effective than specific micro-
interventions. But how can we be sure of having an impact in the long run and in 
relation to such complicated issues?  
From the point of view of political theory, EAs seem both hyper-realists and moralists. 
On the one hand, they are in a sense hyper-realists in that they take the global order and 
                                                          
6 B. Berkey, ‘The Institutional Critique of Effective Altruism’, Utilitas 30 (2018): pp. 143-171. 
7 On this see E. Clough, ‘Effective Altruism’s Political Blind Spot’, Boston Review 14 July (2015).  
8 On this see L. Wenar, ‘Poverty is No Pond. Challenges for the Affluent’, Giving Well: The Ethics of 
Philanthropy, ed. P. Illingworth, T. Pogge and L. Wenar (Oxford, 2010), pp. 104-132.  
9 Berkey, ‘The Institutional Critique’, 162. 
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the institutional setting almost for granted and not as possible targets of change. This is 
so because they think it is beyond our foreseeable control. On the other hand, in so 
doing they recommend doing as much as we can, thus being very demanding moralists.  
We have seen that EAs are committed to a sort of efficient management of the resources 
that have to be devoted to donation in order to yield as much good as possible. 
However, this focus on efficiency is not necessarily the best way to pursue effectiveness 
in general. Of course, an efficient action is also effective because efficiency 
presupposes effectiveness and I am not endorsing the adoption of inefficient solutions. 
Rather, the point I want to make is that efficiency is a specific way of understanding 
effectiveness that may be misleading in some cases. This is especially evident if we 
consider that there are many relevant causes whose advancement requires and has 
required actions that we would not necessarily qualify as efficient. For instance, 
Gandhi’s pacifist movement for India’s independence, M.L. King’s march for the rights 
of African-Americans, and Mandela’s fight for the end of the apartheid regime were all 
complex sets of activities in which the leaders and ordinary people put their life at risk 
without complying with an efficient use of their personal resources. We know now that 
these social movements were eventually effective because the goals were reached. And 
we know that many people supporting them, in particular their leaders, relied on a 
strong faith in the sense of their action. Such faith entailed both a hope in securing the 
final success and a staunch commitment to the morality of their cause, whatever the 
probability of success. However, if we do not consider the ex post success of these 
movements, how could we assess these expectations were we to find ourselves at the 
beginning of their activism? Besides the obvious duty that one has to do the right thing, 
were these actions rational in terms of their expected probability of success? It does not 
seem an exaggeration to say that the probability of success should not have been 
considered high because the initiatives were also very complex and involved a host of 
intermediate and indirect actions in order to reach the goal. And, even if one thought 
that in the end the cause would have been won, were the actions that the movements and 
leaders undertook acceptable (or the best) in terms of efficiency? To be sure, one may 
say that in calculating whether these activists should have engaged in their actions, we 
should factor in not only the very low probability of success, but also and most 
importantly the very high amount of possible gains, thus making the case for the moral 
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necessity to take these initiatives. That is a sensible remark and it would perfectly fit in 
with the spirit of EA. Indeed, depending on the ratio between the assessment of the 
probabilities of success and the amount of possible gain, EA may justify either a rather 
piecemeal and short-term set of engagements, or a long-term and radical set of 
initiatives.   
All these questions are of course very controversial and difficult to answer. What I want 
to point out, though, is that the logic of EA would have hardly ex ante justified these 
actions. But these actions were eventually effective and extremely beneficial to billions 
of people. Hence, what should we think about EA’s theory of effectiveness? Shouldn’t 
we revise it in order to take into account these historical examples?  
In the interests of fairness, we should note that MacAskill claims that EA is not 
reducible to charitable donations because EA can also justify and recommend actions 
that are not easily quantifiable if the expected gains are high (as in the case of political 
careers).10 However, in making reference to a political career and other non-easily 
quantifiable expected goals, whatever MacAskill actually thinks about the desirability 
of these options, he does not spend much time discussing them because the conditions 
that justify engaging in a political career are rarely met. As Iason Gabriel convincingly 
points out, effective altruism is wedded to the logic of frequently changing the priorities 
and addressees of donations in virtue of their varying marginal effectiveness.11 Hence, it 
seems ill-suited to the pursuit of goals requiring longstanding, stubborn and patient 
activism, which might only eventually be effective.12 In theory, supporting structural 
change can be justified in EA’s framework. However, it is unclear how EAs could 
choose to pursue a long and structural cause over the achievement of a specific but 
substantial improvement. At what point in the ratio between probability of success and 
magnitude of the expected achievement should we opt for the initiative with low 
                                                          
10 MacAskill, Doing Good Better, pp. 114-121. 
11 I. Gabriel, ‘Effective Altruism and its Critics’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2017): pp. 457-473. 
12 The commitment to marginal effectiveness also has the paradoxical effect of suggesting that people 
abandon a previously ‘underdog’ cause once it becomes popular and begins to have major effects, J. 
Kissel, ‘Effective Altruism and Anti-Capitalism: An Attempt at Reconciliation’, Essays in Philosophy 18 
(2017): p. 19. 
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probabilities of success but which tackles a structural cause? If, as EAs claim, the 
choice is always comparative, the fate of structural causes seems doomed insofar as one 
can always find a more urgent and specific cause which we should choose in virtue of 
its achievability. One may reply that EA prefers measurable and specific goals to wider 
social changes because there is no sufficient good evidence of the preferability of the 
latter. Hence, EAs are not in principle against structural change for they only want that 
their actions make a real contribution and not be in vain. This point makes sense, but it 
gives further support to my overall claim that, even though EA could in principle 
support any cause, it de facto cannot but opt for certain causes.  
But, one may retort, we should not forget that EAs’ reflections are not limited to the 
minor, although important, improvements to the status quo, for they are also concerned 
with the existential risk that events like asteroids striking Earth might pose to human 
life. This demonstrates that EA’s methodology is not just suited to charity, for it may 
also undertake highly speculative analyses. However, it seems very strange that EAs 
typically focus on either very close and concrete goals or very worrisome but distant 
and speculative ones. This ‘cross-eyed’ perspective leaves out what is in between these 
two extremes: social issues. Although EAs argue that there is nothing in principle that 
prevents EA from tackling structural social issues, the practical urgency and some 
methodological biases probably discourage EAs from properly considering them.  
Addressing structural causes, indeed, is unlikely to be the result of EA’s methodology 
because we should have clear data on the impact of an individual’s contribution and 
contributing to such a cause should have the highest marginal return compared to other 
actions to address other problems. But how can an individual action meet this 
requirement given that in structural causes individual contributions may have such a 
return only if the cause reaches a tipping point after years of relentless but invisible 
efforts? 
In view of these theoretical difficulties, and the fact that at least some major social 
forms of activism for the good do not seem to follow EA’s theory of effectiveness as 
efficiency, shouldn’t we revise it?  
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If, instead, EAs would prefer to stick with their theory in which efficiency, 
measurability, and directness play a paramount role, they should seek an alternative 
justification for this account, which does not rely solely on its effectiveness-value. 
Paradoxically as it may seem, a Stoic interpretation of EA’s focus on the internal 
motivation to donate might be the best way to defend EA. Recall the famous Stoic 
maxim as expressed by Epictetus: we ought to be concerned only with what depends on 
us. What does not depend on us should not be a matter of moral and existential concern. 
So, in this view, what depends on us? Our reactions to external events and our 
motivation to undertake actions. The accomplishment of such actions, or the causes of 
events that perturb our inner disposition do not depend on us.13 From this it follows that 
our control should be directed only towards our inner dispositions, not towards what 
happens in the world, which is beyond our control. Of course, the Stoic’s concern with 
one’s inner sphere does not mean retreating from the world. Rather, it simply concerns 
how one should react to what happens in the world.  
Why do I find these considerations similar to EA’s recommendations? Paradoxically, 
like the ancient Stoic precepts, EA’s recommendations similarly demand that we 
primarily focus on those things that we can control directly. Of course, unlike the Stoic 
principle, EA’s principle of efficient moral concern does not say that we should not care 
about what is not in our control. If we did so, we should not care about the overall 
amount of poverty, and so on. However, EA’s principle of efficient concern may be 
interpreted as holding that one should not be practically concerned with and try to 
achieve what is not under one’s control. What is under one’s control is, first, one’s 
motivation to help and donate, and, second, the direction of this motivation, namely the 
kind of good cause that one can choose. How to achieve the good in practice, and in 
particular how best to achieve it, is not under one’s control and hence should be, so to 
speak, ‘externalized’ to meta-charities and NGOs. This Stoic interpretation seems 
suggestive and may be further explored, but I do not want to overstate the case here.  
To conclude, whatever the best interpretation of EA’s effectiveness, EA has a peculiar 
strategy for dealing with the complexity of the world. From a practical viewpoint, EA 
operates a sort of double externalization: the epistemic difficulty in assessing who’s 
                                                          
13 Epictetus, Handbook of Epictetus (Indianapolis, 1983), §1: 11. 
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effective is outsourced to meta-charities, and the pragmatic difficulty in devising the 
most effective action and implementing it is externalized to the charities and NGOs. In 
sum, EA provides a hyper-control of one’s internal disposition and motivation towards 
donating, while it externalizes the understanding and implementation of actual courses 
of action because it recommends an efficient management of diverse activities 
according to one’s most high-yielding capacities.   
 
IV. EFFECTIVENESS AND OTHER COGNATE NOTIONS    
EA’s account of effectiveness seems reductive insofar as it sees effectiveness as chiefly 
a matter of efficiency, and it is ill-equipped to drive structural social change. But, is this 
necessarily the case? Can we broaden EA’s account of effectiveness so as to address 
these challenges? To this end, EA’s theory of effectiveness should be put in a broader 
network including other cognate notions that are relevant for the practicality of 
normative theories. In particular, in what follows I will briefly present some ideas laid 
out in the debate about the concept of feasibility and realism of political theory. It will 
not be a complete list of all relevant questions. Rather, it should be understood as a map 
of the kinds of cognate notions that a theory of effectiveness should take into account.  
First, within this debate many meta-theoretical questions have been aired. Some have 
wondered what should be the appropriate level of fact-sensitivity for a theory of justice. 
Following G.A. Cohen’s critique of Rawls, the issue of sensitivity to facts has been 
understood in terms of whether and to what extent principles of justice, in order to be 
valid and sound, should depend on (social or natural) facts. Different answers have been 
proposed, ranging from those holding that first principles of justice should be 
independent of facts,14 to those arguing that facts are relevant not only to the 
implementation of principles but also to their definition because, among other things, 
                                                          
14 G. A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality (Cambridge, Mass. & London, 2008). 
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the fact-insensitive level includes underdetermined principles, with little practical 
guidance.15   
Related to this question is the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory. This 
distinction has been phrased in two connected but diverse ways. The Rawlsian 
formulation understands ideal theory as the assumption according to which, under 
favorable conditions, the parties comply with the principles of the theory. This 
assumption is meant to represent how a society would fare if all the parties were to 
follow the principles of the theory so as to show what the duties in these conditions 
are.16 Accordingly, one may ask what the duties are, given a situation of non-
compliance (non-ideality) of the parties. The other sense of the distinction between ideal 
and non-ideal theory is more in line with the issue of fact-sensitivity just noted. In the 
recent debate on the shape that a normative political theory should have, many have 
outlined the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory as a continuum from the 
least fact-sensitive, where highly abstract principles are presented and defended, to the 
theory that includes and mirrors a number of empirical and social facts. Hence, the 
question concerns what level of fact-sensitivity is appropriate to discharge the functions 
of a normative political theory in terms of its capacity to both guide actions and be 
justified independently of the varying contexts.  
Second, effectiveness is related to feasibility. By definition, what is effective is also 
feasible. Feasibility is a modal concept that concerns whether a state of affairs can be 
brought about by individual or collective actions. As conceptualized by Pablo Gilabert 
and Holly Lawford-Smith, (political) feasibility can be understood as both a binary 
concept and a scalar concept.17 To establish whether a state of affairs is binary-feasible 
we should assess whether the action to bring about the state of affairs is compatible with 
some hard constraints, established by the laws of logic, physics, and biology. Scalar-
feasibility can be measured, instead, in terms of the probability of an action resulting in 
                                                          
15 E. Rossi, ‘Facts, Principles and (Real) Politics’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (2016): pp. 505-
520. 
16 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition (Cambridge, Mass., 1999). 
17 P. Gilabert and H. Lawford-Smith, ‘Political Feasibility: A Conceptual Exploration’, Political Studies 
60 (2012): pp. 809-825. 
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the desired state of affairs, given some soft-constraints (cultural, economic, social). The 
types of feasibility have different effects on our duties and practical recommendations. 
Normative principles or political proposals that violate hard constraints are unfeasible – 
thus violating the ‘ought-implies-can’ principle and should not be considered valid – 
whereas the different scores of diverse principles and proposals in the scale of scalar 
feasibility should be weighed in order to evaluate the preferability of practical 
alternatives.  
Third, a further distinction that is relevant here is that between the access-dimension of 
feasibility and the stability-dimension of feasibility.18 Access-feasibility concerns the 
route that might lead from the current state of affairs to the desired state of affairs. This 
requires asking which agents and actions could bring it about and under what 
conditions. Stability-feasibility concerns whether the just state of affairs can actually be 
stable over time. Stability depends mostly on the compatibility between the demands of 
the institutions and rules embedded in the desired state of affairs and the human 
motivational makeup. It also concerns the issue of whether the actions required by the 
normative theory may be, first, immune to perverse effects or self-effacement, and, 
second, self-sustaining, that is, capable of generating autonomous motivation.  
The final issue that is pertinent to our practical commitments towards a just world is that 
of reconciliation. Rawls claimed that one of the tasks of a normative theory is that of 
reconciling ourselves with social reality, by showing that current rules and institutions 
and their history display a rational and justifiable form.19 The importance of 
reconciliation is that of showing that what we seek through normative theory is at least 
partially present in reality, thus pointing out that reality is not completely immoral or 
irrational, and that our endeavors to realize justice more fully are not doomed or inane.  
 
V. EXPANDING EA’S CONCEPTION OF EFFECTIVENESS  
                                                          
18 H. Lawford-Smith, ‘Understanding Political Feasibility’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 21 
(2013): pp. 243-259. 
19 J. Rawls, Justice as Fairness. A Restatement (Cambridge, Mass., 2001), p. 3.  
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With respect to all these questions, EA’s overall relation to practice seems original but 
sketchy. Indeed, most of the questions posed in the previous section are only implicitly 
answered in EA’s writings. In what follows, I will seek to tweak EA’s account of 
effectiveness with a view to answering these questions and proceed a little further.   
First, regarding fact-sensitivity of first principles and the level of ideality of the theory, 
EAs take first principles (e.g. that suffering and poverty are bad and that we should 
alleviate them) to be self-evident, unquestionable and accessible to all well-meaning 
people. Moreover, they are thought to be valid and compelling in any condition, be it 
ideal or fully non-ideal. However, the practical and theoretical approach of EA is set up 
in a markedly non-ideal fashion. This might be a problem because whether and to what 
extent moral principles are binding and action-guiding also depends on the favorability 
of conditions and on the compliance of other people. For instance, the moral principle 
of helping others actually translates into a duty to donate only depending on whether 
people are in need and the extent to which other people are also complying with this 
principle. A world of altruistic donors would not only be impossible, qua too 
demanding, but also qua practically ineffective insofar as the duty to donate is 
conditional upon the existence of needy people, the availability of resources and the 
lack of other channels to meet the interests of needy people.  
Regarding feasibility, EAs typically recommend reliance on the effectiveness-
assessment of meta-charities that evaluate the reliability of NGOs and charities. 
However, this ex post approach may be biased. By only relying on safe and confirmed 
cases of success, EA diminishes the risks of venturing into actions whose capacity to 
reach the goal is uncertain, but it also limits itself to what we already know and what we 
have already done. Of course, EA’s principles might be applied to explore the 
effectiveness of untried methods. However, it is unclear to me what conceptual and 
methodological resources should be employed to assess these methods.  
In a sense, EA’s conception of effectiveness is surprising and paradoxical. On the one 
hand, it is rather ‘moralistic’ in that it targets individuals’ set of motivations and 
attitudes requiring that each devote a significant portion of one’s income to donation. 
On the other hand, it may seem conservative because, as we’ve seen, tackling structural 
issues, while not impossible, may only be justified under rare circumstances. In sum, 
16 
 
this overall conception of effectiveness is demanding but non-ideal, and focuses on the 
most pressing problems without being fully concerned with the causes of these 
problems. It is neither a radical view, nor a conservative one. In short, it is a sort of 
remedial effectiveness, insofar as it is only concerned with the salient expressions of 
problems without addressing the underlying structures thereof. Building on this, we may 
seek to outline what EA could say on the other issues related to effectiveness even 
though they have not been outlined yet.  
First, one may ask: What could EA say about access-feasibility? The answer to this 
question depends on how we understand the ideal or end-state that EA is seeking to 
advance. On the one hand, we might interpret it as access to the condition where more 
(or most) people donate and behave altruistically. Hence the remedy to the most 
pressing moral problems is put in place by altruistic actions. On the other hand, if we 
think that altruistic actions are not the solution but mere proxies to a better state of 
affairs, we should ask what this better state of affairs consists in. On this we have no 
clear indicators, as EAs seem to rely on the intuitive idea that certain moral wrongs are 
clear enough, and that we ought to convince people to act in order to solve these 
problems, rather than convince people as to why these situations are moral problems. 
Such an end-state would be a condition where most pressing moral problems are solved. 
But are we sure that it is uncontroversial to establish how a society without these 
problems would look? This is hardly so, and EAs would be better having at least a 
working idea of what kind of end-state they are working towards.  
If we suppose that EAs are not completely happy with the structure of current states of 
affairs and rather think that some institutions ought to be changed, what kind of 
transformative effectiveness would be compatible with the principles of EA? The kind 
of changes required will depend on other issues. People like Singer would now consider 
it unnecessary to change the capitalist system because it has improved the conditions of 
many people. Some other activists and commentators have held that EA actually ‘loves 
systemic change.’20 However, it is not clear what this might mean – a more democratic 
society, a more affluent one, or a vegan one. EA is currently mostly concerned with 
charity but perhaps it is not necessarily wedded to this. To avoid the objection that it 
                                                          
20 https://80000hours.org/2015/07/effective-altruists-love-systemic-change/  
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cannot support structural change, perhaps EAs should clarify the nature of EA. Either 
EA is a moral method to solve pressing problems that are already established as such, or 
EA is a substantive specific moral theory: in both cases, a specification of EA’s ideal is 
lacking. If EAs opt for the former alternative, then EA should rely on people’s intuition 
about what are the most pressing causes and we would still not have a definition of 
EA’s ideal. If EAs opt for the latter alternative, they can better vindicate EA’s 
theoretical and methodological strength, but they could no longer present EA as a 
neutral practical method.  
Next let us turn to the stability question. On the one hand, this question depends on 
whether EA demands a transformation of our current world – a transformation which, as 
we have just seen, remains unspecified. On the other hand, we can try to provide an 
answer even if there is no transformative concern in EA. We can ask what the world 
would look like if all or at least a conspicuous number of people followed EA’s 
prescriptions, even within the current institutional system. David Schmidtz has argued 
that if people were to strictly follow the ethics of giving – which, for our purposes, is 
the same as EA – the current world would actually collapse because people would stop 
spending money on a vast array of issues that would be considered futile.21 But if so, 
large portions of our economic system would simply be destroyed. This is clearly 
undesirable from many normative perspectives, including the ones typically endorsed 
by EAs. A supporter of EA may retort that Schmidtz’s conclusion is unwarranted 
because the application of EA’s principle by the majority of people would not 
necessarily lead to the economic collapse. Whatever conclusion is the correct one, in 
theories of EA there seems to be something missing regarding the relation between the 
ideal, if any, and its application in reality. Is EA a universal account that applies to any 
realistic domain, or is it applicable only under (our) very non-ideal conditions?  
What if we could convince most people to become EAs? What would a world 
embedding the principles of EA look like? To make it more functioning than in 
Schmidtz’s imaginary world, we should also consider some institutional issues. Hence, 
we should imagine what institutional rules there could be, if they were to be 
                                                          
21 D. Schmidtz, ‘Islands in a Sea of Obligation: Limits of the Duty to Rescue’, Law and Philosophy 19 
(2000): pp. 683-705. 
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underpinned by EA. We might think of it as a society in which all or most people are 
moved by altruistic motivations, thus retaining only a portion of their work for 
themselves. Such a society would not generate an egalitarian sharing of the products of 
social cooperation, but it would certainly make substantive redistributions through acts 
of voluntary giving. However, that would amount to an ethical ideal with still little 
institutional framework. To tease out its features, it is perhaps helpful to compare it with 
another quite moralistic theory that similarly gives a prominent role to altruistic 
motivations: G.A. Cohen’s idea of an egalitarian ethos. Against Rawls, Cohen famously 
claimed that an egalitarian ethos is a necessary component of a just society and a  
society is more just when its members do not require inequality-generating 
incentives but rather, inspired by distributive justice (and subject to a personal 
prerogative), consider the interests of others when making productive choices 
(both about how many hours to work and what career to pursue).22 
 
In Cohen’s just society, morality demands that one forsake market-driven (monetary) 
incentives to be mostly productive and contribute to social cooperation. In this society, 
people should accept being paid less than their real contribution to social cooperation, in 
virtue of people’s commitment to the egalitarian ethos. EAs take the opposite route and 
claim that market-driven incentives (and institutions) should be employed to maximize 
social production, so that altruistic individuals may donate larger shares of their income 
to the neediest. It is unclear, though, whether such a motivation can and should remain 
purely a matter of individual ethical behavior in a framework where the institutions not 
only do not reinforce it but also cause parts of the problems that altruism addresses.  
 
Finally, what could EA say about reconciliation? In one sense, EA is committed to 
providing grounds for reconciliation. In giving people a moral motivation to abide by 
current rules and practices while aiming at doing as much good as one can, EA has the 
(unintended?) effect of reconciling people with their jobs and social functions, while 
requiring an important change in the personal advantage that one takes from one’s 
                                                          
22 P. Tomlin, ‘Survey Article: Internal Doubts about Cohen’s Rescue of Justice’, The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 18 (2010): pp. 228-247, at 231. 
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position. Perhaps a kind of reason for reconciliation with the economic structures can be 
found in Singer’s words, where he says that, irrespective of whether we value equality 
as an intrinsic or extrinsic value, capitalism has certainly increased inequalities but also 
‘lifted hundreds of millions out of extreme poverty’.23 Hence, the worries about being 
complicit in a rotten system should be weakened because capitalism’s overall 
consequences are positive.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
In conclusion, let me sketch out some considerations on what EAs could do to complete 
their account of effectiveness. If what I have argued is correct, EAs interpret 
effectiveness in terms of efficiency of individual contributions. I don’t claim that this 
perspective is wrong. Indeed, it may be interpreted as a way to guarantee that one’s 
contribution does bring about positive consequences. There seems to be a 
commonsensical concern for not wasting resources and people’s effort. However, this 
perspective seems limited because: (i) it cannot de facto track structural social changes; 
and (ii) it is limited to an ex post assessment of effectiveness on the basis of what has 
been effective, thus restricting the field of possibilities.  
These two features are understandable in light of the very limited epistemic and 
practical resources that each of us has. As said, on this I partially agree with Berkey’s  
defense of EA against the institutionalist critique. By contrast, I am less convinced by 
Jeff McMahan’s argument against the same kind of criticism:  
I am neither a community nor a state. I can determine only what I will do, not 
what my community or state will do. I can, of course, decide to concentrate my 
individual efforts on changing my state’s institutions, or indeed on trying to 
change global economic institutions, though the probability of my making a 
difference to the lives of badly impoverished people may be substantially lower 
if I adopt this course than if I undertake more direct action, unmediated by the 
                                                          
23 Singer, The Most Good, p. 50. It is worth remarking that this positive evaluation of capitalism is 
conditional and that Singer was previously more critical of it.  
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state. It is obviously better, however, if people do both. Yet there has to be a 
certain division of moral labor.24 
 
I agree that a certain division of moral labor is inevitable. However, from this the 
restriction at the beginning of the quoted passage does not follow. It is true that, strictly 
speaking, I can only determine what is under my control, namely what ‘I will do’ 
because I cannot determine ‘what my community or state will do’. However, I can 
demand that my community or state take a certain initiative. Although influencing the 
state is not under my control, I have many ways of exerting some pressure (voting, 
public campaigning, demonstrating, striking, engaging in civil disobedience, and so on). 
Moreover, what is morally relevant here is not only the causal capacity of agents to 
determine what they and others can do. Having legitimate expectations and advancing 
moral claims on institutions is a fundamental part of the moral interplay between 
individuals and collective institutions. What we demand of states and institutions does 
not automatically and directly translate into state’s initiatives, but it is not a waste of 
time or a form of exoneration from one’s responsibility towards those who are in 
serious need. This is particularly the case if the causes of this need are dependent upon 
and enforced by an institutional system.  
In sum, it is understandable only to focus on donations and NGOs if we exclusively take 
the point of view of what individuals qua separate individuals ought to do. However, we 
are part of moral communities which consist in a web of mutual obligations and 
corresponding reciprocal expectations.25 Hence, as a sort of constructive proposal, I 
claim that EAs should take into account the possibility of adopting a perspective that 
includes public institutions too, both as actors and partners of initiatives in EA.  
How, then, should the theory of effectiveness change? Besides not restricting itself to an 
efficiency-driven approach, it should perhaps not only focus on individuals’ choices. 
Without dismissing the importance of individual and private initiatives, durable and 
fundamental change cannot be brought about without institutions and states. How can 
                                                          
24 McMahan, ‘Philosophical Critiques’, p. 95. 
25 In addition to individual obligations, people also have collective obligations. On this see, A. Dietz, 
‘Effective Altruism and Collective Obligations’, Utilitas 31(2019): pp. 106-115.  
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EAs estimate the probability of success of such agents? That is impossible to say in 
general. Perhaps only local solutions may be found. However, other variables may be 
taken into account regarding, for instance, the track record of a state (or institution) in 
addressing a problem, its reliability in terms of motivation, and its capacity to revise the 
policy in case of failure.  
Addressing the structural causes of the wrongs that EA wants to tackle, and targeting 
states and institutions too, means that EA should also consider the further issues 
mentioned in the previous section: what is the ‘ideal of EA’? Are the duties we have 
duties of a non-ideal situation that would disappear in a just condition? How is the 
‘ideal of EA’ accessible and stable? Should we only try to convince people to adopt 
EA’s principles, or would it be desirable to coerce people to abide by these principle? Is 
the theory of effectiveness for public and institutional actors the same as the one EA 
uses for individual and private organizations? Answering all these questions – and many 
others – requires further theorizing and a broader dialogue between EA’s typical focus 
on individual moral choices and the perspective of political philosophy. Although this 
might seem too long a detour for EAs, who are rightly concerned with the urgency of 
many practical issues, it should not be considered a waste of time for a movement that is 
committed to theoretically grounded social engagement. EAs would object that 
answering all these questions is a waste of time given that more theorizing along the 
lines I have suggested does not seem conducive to doing more good. In reply, this is not 
necessarily true to the extent that clarifying one’s ideal serves the purpose of 
establishing the direction of the movement. Establishing this, as well as the other 
aspects mentioned above, is also necessary if the movement gains further support. To 
the extent that the movement expands its activities and influence, a better understanding 
of the compatibility of diverse goals and their influence on other societal challenges is a 
practical and theoretical necessity. In sum, the possible scaling-up of the movement also 
requires some theoretical choices on its foundation and compatibility with other social 
issues.  
To conclude, regarding the question of whether EA can support structural changes, we 
may admit that in theory EA could justify the initiative to support changes in societal, 
political and structural issues. However, whether and how such changes may be 
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endorsed by the current EA framework is uncertain because it all depends on the 
estimation of the probabilities of success, plus the weighing of the importance of 
possible outcomes. That very important changes may be justified despite their low 
probabilities of success is possible but unlikely within EA’s framework, given that the 
(understandable) focus on effectiveness leads to a preference for goals that are more 
easily and clearly achievable. An expansion or reformulation of EA’s conceptual tools 
and its idea of effectiveness along the lines suggested above may be a way to address 
the ambiguous attitude towards structural changes.26  
 
                                                          
26 I am grateful to Chiara Cordelli, Rainer Ebert, Josh Milburn, Selina O’Doherty, Gianfranco Pellegrino 
and to two journal’s anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on previous versions of this paper.  
